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Covariance
I ~x and ~y are valued in the intervals [a; b] and [c ; d ].
I
Cov(~x ; ~y) = E~x~y   E~xE ~y : (1)
I E~x~y  E~xE ~y if and only if ~x and ~y co-vary positively.
Equity premium
I u: the bivariate utility of the representative agent
I ~x : the GDP per capita
I ~y : the background risk
I Equity premium, ':
' =
E~xEu(1;0)(~x ; ~y)
E~xu(1;0)(~x ; ~y)
  1: (2)
I u(k1;k2): the (k1; k2)th cross derivative of u, i.e.,
u(k1;k2) = @
k1+k2
@xk1@yk2
u(x ; y)
Signing equity premium
I Full information: e.g., u(x ; y) = log(x + y) and (~x ; ~y) is
joint-normal distributed ) sign(')
I Partial information: e.g., risk aversion and (~x ; ~y) is aliated
) sign(') ?
I Sign the covariance between functions
Covariance between monotonic functions
I Denition (Esary et al. 1967, p1466) (~x ; ~y) is said to be
associated if for all functions ,  which are increasing in each
component,
Cov((~x ; ~y); (~x ; ~y))  0: (3)
I Risk averse in x (u(2;0) < 0), correlation averse (u(1;1)  0)
and (~x ; ~y) is associated ) '  0
Higher-order risk attitudes
I Higher-order risk attitudes (e. g., prudence and
temperance),signing the higher-order derivative of the utility
function (expected utility framework)
I Weaker dependence structures of (~x ; ~y)
N th-order stochastic dominance dependence
I Denition Dene F 1(y jx) = F (y jx) and
F n+1(y jx) = R yc F n(tjx)dt. We say that ~y is Nth-order
stochastic dominance dependent on x (NthSDD(~y jx)) if
(i) FN(y jx 0)  FN(y jx) for all y and x 0  x ;
(ii) F n(d jx 0)  F n(d jx) for all y , x 0  x and n = 1; :::N   1.
I Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992): Third-order stochastic
dominance dependence
Covariance between functions beyond monotonicity
I Denition (Denuit et al. 1999) The class U(s1;s2) icv of the
regular (s1; s2)-increasing concave functions dened as the
class of all the functions u, for s1 and s2 are positive integers,
such that ( 1)k1+k2+1u(k1;k2)  0 for all k1 = 0; 1; :::; s1,
k2 = 0; 1; :::; s2 with k1 + k2  1.
I Proposition
The following statements are equivalent.
(i)
Cov((~x ; ~y); (~x ; ~y))  0 (4)
for all  and  such that (1;0)  0, (1;0)  0,  2 U(0;I ) icv
and  2 U(0;J) icv ;
(ii) NthSDD(~y jx) where N = min(I ; J).
Various concepts of bivariate dependence
I
(~x ; ~y) is associated (5)
) NthSDD(~y jx)
) positive NthED(~y jx)
I
positive SED on ~y ) (~x ; ~y) is positive correlated (6)
Risk aversion in the presence of another risk
I Proposition(Finkelshtain et al. 1999, part (a) and (b) of
Theorem 2)
The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Eu(~x ; ~y)  Eu(E~x ; ~y) for (~x ; ~y) such that E (~x j~y) is
increasing in y ;
(ii) u(2;0)  0 and u(1;1)  0.
Risk aversion in the presence of another risk
I Proposition
Suppose NthSDD(~y jx), u(2;0)  0 and  u(1;0) 2 U(0;N) icv ,
then
Eu(~x ; ~y)  Eu(E~x ; ~y): (7)
If one of the following conditions is satised, then an agent is risk
averse for ~x in the presence of ~y :
(i) she is risk averse in x (u(2;0)  0), correlation averse
(u(1;1)  0) and FSDD(~y jx);
(ii) she is risk averse in x (u(2;0)  0), correlation averse u(1;1)  0,
cross-prudent in x ( u(1;2)  0) and SSDD(~y jx);
(iii) she is risk averse in x (u(2;0)  0), correlation averse
u(1;1)  0, cross-prudent and cross-temperate in x (u(1;2)  0 and
u(1;3)  0), and TSDD(~y jx).
Application
I
U(s) = u0(x0   s; h0) + 1
1 + 
Eu1(s(1 + r) + ~x ; ~h) (8)
u
(1;0)
0 (x0   s; h0) =
1 + r
1 + 
Eu
(1;0)
1 (s
(1 + r) + ~x ; ~h) (9)
sx ;E : the solution with (~x ;E~h) substituted for (~x ; ~h)
sE ;h: the solution with (E~x ; ~h) substituted for (~x ; ~h).
I Proposition
(i) u
(2;0)
0  0, u(2;0)1  0, u(1;2)1  0, u(1;1)1 2 U(N;0) icv and
NthSDD(~x jh) ) s  sx ;E ;
(ii) u
(2;0)
0  0, u(3;0)1  0, u(2;0)1 2 U(0;N) icv and
NthSDD(~hjx) ) s  sE ;h.
Application
I
V (a) = u0(x0   a; h0) + 1
1 + 
Eu1(~x ; ~h + a) (10)
The optimal amount of investment a is determined by
u
(1;0)
0 (x0   a; h0) =
m
1 + 
Eu
(0;1)
1 (~x ;
~h +ma) (11)
ax ;E : the solution with (~x ;E~h) substituted for (~x ; ~h)
aE ;h: the solution with (E~x ; ~h) substituted for (~x ; ~h).
I Proposition
(i) u
(2;0)
0  0, u(0;3)1  0, u(0;2)1 2 U(N;0) icv and NthSDD(~x jh)
) a  ax ;E ;
(ii) u
(2;0)
0  0, u(0;2)1  0, u(2;1)1  0, u(1;1)1 2 U(0;N) icv and
NthSDD(~hjx) ) a  aE ;h.
A class of bivariate stochastic orderings
I (~x1; ~y1) and (~x2; ~y2) are two 2-dimensional random vectors
with density functions f and g
Eu(~x1; ~y1) =
Z b
a
Z d
c
u(x ; y)f (x ; y)dxdy (12)
=
Z b
a
Z d
c
u(x ; y)
f (x ; y)
g(x ; y)
g(x ; y)dxdy
= E [u(~x2; ~y2)
f (~x2; ~y2)
g(~x2; ~y2)
]
= E [u(~x2; ~y2)] + Cov [u(~x2; ~y2);
f (~x2; ~y2)
g(~x2; ~y2)
];
If (~x2; ~y2) is associated and
f
g is increasing in x and y , then
Eu(~x1; ~y1)  E [u(~x2; ~y2)] (see e.g., Shaked and Shanthikumar
2007, Theorem 6.B.8).
A class of bivariate stochastic orderings
I Proposition
The following statements are equivalent.
(i) Eu(~x1; ~y1)  E [u(~x2; ~y2)] for all u, f and g such that
u(1;0)  0, ( fg )(1;0)  0, u 2 U(0;I ) icv , ( fg ) 2 U(0;J) icv ;
(ii) NthSDD(~y jx) where N = min(I ; J).
When I = J = 2, Eu(~x1; ~y1)  E [u(~x2; ~y2)] if u is monotonic
(u(1;0)  0 and u(0;1)  0) and risk averse in y (u(0;2)  0), fg is
increasing in x and y , concave in y , and SSDD(~y jx).
Application
I
U(s) = u0(x0   s; h0) + 1
1 + 
Eu1(s(1 + r) + ~x ; ~h) (13)
u
(1;0)
0 (x0   s; h0) =
1 + r
1 + 
Eu
(1;0)
1 (s
(1 + r) + ~x ; ~h) (14)
s 0: the solution with (~x 0; ~h0) substituted for (~x ; ~h)
I Proposition u(2;0)0  0, u(2;0)1  0, ( fg )(1;0)  0,
 u(1;0)1 2 U(0;I ) icv , ( fg ) 2 U(0;J) icv and NthSDD(~h0jx 0)
where N = min(I ; J) ) s  s 0;
Application
I
V (a) = u0(x0   a; h0) + 1
1 + 
Eu1(~x ; ~h + a) (15)
The optimal amount of investment a is determined by
u
(1;0)
0 (x0   a; h0) =
m
1 + 
Eu
(0;1)
1 (~x ;
~h +ma) (16)
a: the solution of (16) with (~x 0; ~h0) substituted for (~x ; ~h)
I Proposition u(2;0)0  0, u(0;2)1  0, u(1;1)1  0, ( fg )(1;0)  0,
 u(0;1)1 2 U(0;I ) icv , ( fg ) 2 U(0;J) icv and NthSDD(~h0jx 0) )
a  a0.
Justify the rst-order approach to bi-signal principal-agent
problems
I
U(a) =
Z b
a
Z d
c
u(s(x ; y))f (x ; y ja)dxdy   a (17)
I U(a) is concave ) First-order-approach (FOA)
I Monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLRC) and the
concavity of the distribution function condition (CDFC)
(Rogerson, 1985) ) U(a) is concave
I Most of the distribution functions do not have the CDFC
property
Justify the rst-order approach to bi-signal principal-agent
problems
I Jewitt: Dene H(x ; y) = u(s(x ; y)).
d2
da2
U(a) =  Cov(H(~x ; ~y));  faa(~x ; ~y ja)
f (~x ; ~y ja) ); (18)
I (~x ; ~y) is aliated, H(x ; y) and   faa(x ;y ja)f (x ;y ja) are increasing
functions ) d2
da2
U(a)  0
Justify the rst-order approach to bi-signal principal-agent
problems
I Proposition:
The following statements are equivalent.
(i)
d2
da2
U(a)  0 (19)
for all H(x ; y) and f (x ; y ja) such that H(1;0)  0
( faaf )
(1;0)  0, H 2 U(0;I ) icv and   faaf 2 U(0;J) icv ;
(ii) NthSDD(~y jx) where N = min(I ; J).
